Geschreven door Juliette Poelman
Geschreven op 18 september 2026
Introduction
During the World Cup qualifiers between El Salvador and Honduras, tensions ran so high that they contributed to the outbreak of an armed conflict between the two countries.[1] Another example is the murder of the Colombian defender Andrés Escobar. This happened shortly after he had scored an own goal during the group match between the United States and Colombia at the 1994 World Cup.[2]
Football is followed worldwide and discussed at length on talk shows, sports programmes and on social media. One person, in particular, is often placed under the microscope: the referee. His[3] decisions often determine the outcome of a match, and as a result, the criticism of those decisions can sometimes be relentless. On the pitch, such criticism has clear limits: a single insult can quickly result in a yellow or red card. Yet those limits do not necessarily disappear once the match is over. Even outside the stadium, not every comment about a referee is automatically permissible.
Top-level referees must tolerate a certain degree of public criticism. The limits of what constitutes acceptable criticism are therefore broader for them than for ordinary citizens.[4] However, limits remain. When does criticism of a referee go too far? In other words: where does the freedom of expression protected by Article 10 the of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) end, and where does the referee’s right to respect for private life, protected by Article 8 of the ECHR, begin?
This question was central to the case De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal,[5] in which the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) had to consider whether harsh public statements about football referees were protected under Article 10 ECHR. In this publication, I discuss this case and examine the question of when harsh criticism of a referee falls within the protection of the right to freedom of expression and when it crosses the line into impermissible accusations that interfere with the right to respect for private life.
A red card for F.C. Porto
In the case of De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal,[6] the ECtHR assessed disciplinary sanctions imposed by the Portuguese Football Federation on football club F.C. Porto, its chairman and its communications director. The case arose from a series of public statements in which not only individual referees but also the Portuguese refereeing system came under heavy criticism. For instance, during a television broadcast, the communications director stated that a ‘monster’ had been created to influence referees and thereby determine the outcome of matches.[7] According to him, Benfica, F.C. Porto’s arch-rival, was the ‘puppet master’ who had created the monster.[8] The referee was also fiercely criticised in F.C. Porto’s club newsletter, Dragões Diário. It referred to an ‘octopus’ that was said to exert control over Portuguese football with its ‘tentacles’. According to F.C. Porto, this alleged system ensured that inexperienced referees were favoured and the club’s interests were harmed.[9]
In addition, F.C. Porto criticised the video assistant referee (‘VAR’) in its club newsletter. According to the club, he had an ‘issue with impartiality’ and should therefore no longer act as a referee in matches that could be decisive for the league title.[10]
“B.P. had a career as a referee [which was] full of untenable decisions, and now, as a [Video Assistant Referee – VAR], he is following the same shameful path. Yesterday, in [Santa Maria da Feira], he flagged up a penalty kick in favour of Benfica after a push that was so light that it made Pizzi fall in slow motion. However, he turned a blind eye to two throws in the Benfica area, one of which was a clear foot stomp. Last year, also in [Santa Maria da Feira], the same VAR overlooked a very clear [foul] committed against Marcano [which would have given rise to a penalty kick]. There can be no doubt that B.P. seems to have an issue with impartiality, and this may and should lead to his withdrawal from the matches which will decide the championship.”[11]
The Portuguese Football Federation did not let these remarks go unpunished. F.C. Porto and its representatives were fined amounts ranging from €459 to €15,300. In addition, the chairman and the communications director were temporarily suspended.[12]
F.C. Porto brings the case before the ECtHR
F.C. Porto and its representatives did not accept these sanctions and, after having exhausted all domestic legal remedies, took their case to the ECtHR. They argued that the disciplinary sanctions violated their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 ECHR. In their view, the statements related to a matter of public interest and, given the public profile of the referees and the Portuguese Football Federation, they were required to tolerate a greater degree of criticism. Furthermore, they argued that the sanctions would have a chilling effect on public debate about football. Consequently, they contended that the sanctions were not necessary in a democratic society.[13]
The Portuguese Government, on the other hand, argued that the statements exceeded the limits of permissible criticism. In its view, the statements contained unfounded allegations of bias and match-fixing which seriously damaged the honour and reputation of the referees concerned. The government also argued that, given their influence, club officials have a special responsibility not to further fuel tensions within football. In its view, the sanctions imposed were proportionate.[14]
Fair balance
The case essentially centred on the competing human rights: i) the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR and ii) the right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. The latter right also encompasses the right to protection of reputation.[15] As neither of these rights is absolute, the ECtHR had to assess whether the national authorities had struck a ‘fair balance’ between the two rights.[16]
It is important to note that, for Article 8 of the ECHR to apply, an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of seriousness and occur in a manner that impairs the person’s enjoyment of the right to respect for private life.[17] The Court recognised that the statements related to a matter of public interest, namely the integrity of football,[18] and that referees at the highest level are public figures who must tolerate more criticism than ordinary citizens. Criticism of refereeing decisions is therefore, in principle, protected by Article 10 ECHR.[19]
Limits of freedom of expression
However, according to the Court, most of F.C. Porto’s statements went beyond strong criticism. The allegations of corruption and match-fixing were particularly serious, as they suggested that criminal offences had been committed. The repeated nature of the allegations and the fact that they were directed at specific individuals also weighed against F.C. Porto. Furthermore, the statements touched upon the core ethical principles of sport. As such allegations can seriously damage the professional and personal reputation of referees, the Court held that they must be based on a sufficient factual basis.[20] As this was lacking, the Court found that there had been no violation of the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR and ruled that the national authorities were entitled to sanction the statements.[21]
Value judgement on the referee’s conduct
The Court took a different view regarding one statement, in which it was suggested that the VAR appeared to have ‘an issue with impartiality’. The statement merely pointed to the VAR’s lack of impartiality. It was not suggested that the referee had been bribed to manipulate the result of the match, but only that he appeared to have a problem with impartiality and that this should lead to his withdrawal from matches. The Court characterised this as a value judgement on his conduct, which fell within the scope of freedom of expression.[22] Therefore, the Court found that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the ECHR in this regard.[23]
Finally, the Court considered that the fines and temporary suspensions imposed, in so far as they related to the unfounded allegations of corruption and match-fixing, were not disproportionate. The fine that had been wrongly imposed for the statement in question was to be refunded to F.C. Porto.[24]
Conclusion: sharp criticism is permitted, but unfounded allegations are not
The case of De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal illustrates that freedom of expression is not unlimited, even in the world of football. High-level referees are public figures and must therefore tolerate a considerable degree of criticism of their performance. Criticism of a decision or an assessment of a referee’s impartiality is, in principle, protected under Article 10 of the ECHR.
The protection afforded by Article 10 ECHR does not, however, extend to serious allegations of fact, such as accusations of corruption or match-fixing, where those allegations lack a sufficient factual basis. Given their potential to seriously damage a referee’s reputation, such allegations require a sound factual basis. This judgment thus makes clear that sharp criticism of a referee is permissible, but that the right to freedom of expression does not extend to unfounded allegations.
Conclusion: sharp criticism is permitted, but unfounded allegations are not
The case of De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal illustrates that freedom of expression is not unlimited, even in the world of football. High-level referees are public figures and must therefore tolerate a considerable degree of criticism of their performance. Criticism of a decision or an assessment of a referee’s impartiality is, in principle, protected under Article 10 of the ECHR.
The protection afforded by Article 10 ECHR does not, however, extend to serious allegations of fact, such as accusations of corruption or match-fixing, where those allegations lack a sufficient factual basis. Given their potential to seriously damage a referee’s reputation, such allegations require a sound factual basis. This judgment thus makes clear that sharp criticism of a referee is permissible, but that the right to freedom of expression does not extend to unfounded allegations.
[1] https://geschiedenismagazine.nl/de-100-urige-voetbaloorlog-van-69
[2] https://nos.nl/artikel/665767-plaatje-1990-andres-escobar
[3] For the sake of readability, the term ‘referee’ is used in the masculine form in this article. Naturally, the referee may also be a woman.
[4] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 118 & ECHR 21 January 1999, Janowski v. Poland, no. 25716/94, para. 33.
[5] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319.
[6] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319.
[7] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 14.
[8] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 16.
[9] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, paras. 18–19.
[10] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 60.
[11] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 60.
[12] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 2.
[13] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, paras. 95–97.
[14] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, paras. 98–101.
[15] ECtHR 7 February 2012, Axel Springer AG v. Germany, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:0207JUD003995408, para. 83.
[16] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 115.
[17] ECtHR 7 February 2012, Axel Springer AG v. Germany, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:0207JUD003995408, para. 83.
[18] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 116.
[19] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, paras. 118–119.
[20] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 126.
[21] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, paras. 133–134.
[22] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 128.
[23] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, para. 135.
[24] ECtHR 7 July 2026, De Carvalho Marques and Others v. Portugal, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2026:0707JUD002970319, paras. 137–140.
